Diplomacy and the Future of World Order by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Politics
ISBN: 9781647120948
Google: 638nEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 56362252
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
Published: 2021-01-15T08:13:33+00:00

CONCLUSION: PD BY DEFAULT, IF NOT BY DESIGN?

The ADMM-Plus’s achievements underscore an unexpected occurrence few imagined was possible in the context of ASEAN-led security regionalism, owing to the drawbacks of the ARF. In contrast to the ARF, the ADMM-Plus is intentionally developing a capacity to engage in PD, even if the group has never formally declared its intentions to be a PD actor. Why has the ADMM-Plus progressed where the ARF presumably failed? Significantly, both arrangements share the same institutional design, make decisions on the basis of a consensus, and are ASEAN-centered. However, where the ARF has shown itself unwieldy in terms of the size of its membership and the scale of its putative ambitions, the ADMM-Plus arguably consists of a more manageable number of relatively likeminded states with sufficiently common interests and aversions that have eschewed grandiose aspirations in favor of functional, practical, and actionable cooperative activities (Tan 2012). But as we have seen, the ADMM-Plus is not immune to rivalries among its member countries, a number of which have engaged in institutional balancing and will likely continue doing so. Arguably, in order to enjoy sustained success as a security mechanism, the ADMM-Plus would likely require a preexisting stable balance of power among its stakeholders because its present structure—not unlike that of the ARF, with ASEAN playing a central diplomatic role—is incapable of creating such a balance for the reason that ASEAN centrality potentially “confuses power and responsibility and generates frustration” among the non-ASEAN participants in ASEAN-led multilateralism (Rüland 2012). Without the mutual support of the big and regional powers, an ADMM-Plus with ASEAN at the helm can only go so far as a security mechanism. As noted in this chapter’s introductory remarks, we saddle unwarranted expectations on Asia-Pacific multilateralism at our peril because ASEAN-led institutions—and the ADMM-Plus is no exception—are assuredly not “peace processes” and therefore should not be treated as such (Leifer 1999). Their aims are relatively modest, and their achievements—where success is best defined and measured in terms of mundane functional accomplishments, such as those described in the foregoing analysis—are even less so (Baldino and Carr 2016). That said, absent ASEAN, it is questionable that any Asia-Pacific arrangement comanaged by the great powers would automatically fare better than an ASEAN-led one, especially in this present era of great power rivalry and discord.

Yet it is also from these trying experiences that regional countries are learning to circumvent difficulties caused by excessive balancing among themselves. For instance, institutional balancing among ARF member states has led to gridlock in the ARF, such that the requisite consensus for the ARF to progress toward PD could not be achieved. As noted above, the ARF suffered setbacks in 2010 and 2014 as a consequence of diplomatic sparring between its Chinese and US participants over the South China Sea. Conversely, the fact that the ADMM-Plus has been able to progress to the extent it has could perhaps be attributed in part to the determination of ADMM-Plus members that are also ARF members to

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.